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Abstract: This paper explores the complex evolution of the role anthropologists have played as
cultural experts in the regulation of the entheogenic use of the peyote cactus throughout the 20th
century. As experts of the “peyote cult”, anthropologists provided testimonies and cultural expertise
in the regulatory debates in American legislative and judiciary arenas in order to counterbalance the
demonization and prohibition of the medicinal and sacramental use of peyote by Native Americans
through state and federal legislations. In the meantime, anthropologists have encouraged Peyotists to
form a pan-tribal religious institution as a way to secure legal protection of their practice; in 1918,
the Native American Church (NAC) was incorporated in Oklahoma, with its articles explicitly
referring to the sacramental use of peyote. Operating as cultural experts, anthropologists have
therefore assisted jurists in their understanding of the cultural and religious significance of peyote,
and have at the same time counseled Native Americans in their interaction with the legal system and
in the formatting of their claims in appropriate legal terms. This complex legal controversy therefore
provides ample material for a general exploration of the use, evolution, and impact of cultural
expertise in the American legal system, and of the various forms this expertise can take, thereby
contributing to the contemporary efforts at surveying and theorizing cultural expertise. Through an
historical and descriptive approach, the analysis notably demonstrates that the role of anthropologists
as cultural experts has been marked by a practical and substantive evolution throughout the 20th
century, and should therefore not be restrictively understood in relation to expert witnessing before
courts. Rather, this paper underlines the transformative and multifaceted nature of cultural expertise,
and highlights the problematic duality of the position that the two “generations” of anthropologists
involved in this controversy have experienced, navigating between a supposedly impartial position
as experts, and an arguably biased engagement as advocates for Native American religious rights.
Keywords: cultural expertise; expert testimony; applied anthropology; controlled substances; peyote;
entheogens; strategic litigation; indigenous rights; law and culture
1. Introduction
Since the earliest recognition of its use on Native American reservations in the late 1880s, peyote
has laid at the heart of a series of legal battles over religious rights and indigenous self-determination
in the United States (Stewart 1993; Maroukis 2012; Dawson 2018). Yet, in spite of the persistent assaults
by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Christian groups, physicians, and prohibitionist organizations in order
to control, and ultimately eliminate, the psychoactive cactus in the interest of cultural assimilation,
moral rectitude, religious purity, and public health, the entheogenic use of peyote has been able to
survive both the prohibition and the war on drugs eras. Resulting from the confrontation of two
radically different rationalities where the small hallucinogenic cactus constitutes either a narcotic or
a sacred medicine, this long-standing and complex conflict finds its origin in the history of colonial
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Mexico, and eventually became a reference point in the legal debate over nonrecreational use of
psychoactive substances.
Drawing upon a socio-historical inquiry into this legal controversy, the article proposes a critical
exploration of the evolution of the instrumental role that two generations of American anthropologists
have played in this conflict as cultural experts (Grillo 2016; Holden 2011, 2019a, 2019b; Rodriguez 2018).
Far from limiting themselves to expert witnessing, anthropologists have indeed proved strategic
allies for Native Americans, counseling them in their interactions with the American legal system in
order to protect their entheogenic practice from prohibition. This complex legal controversy, whose
origins will be examined in Part 2, hence provides ample material for a general exploration of the
use, forms, and impact of cultural expertise. Part 3 considers the role of anthropologists in assisting
Native Americans in the defense of their entheogenic practice against early 20th century prohibition
efforts. Led by James Mooney, anthropologists testified before lawmakers at several occasions, and later
encouraged the movement’s leaders to organize into an established church. Finally, Part 4 explores the
reconfiguration of cultural expertise in the peyote controversy, as the proliferation of court cases after
the Second World War led a new generation of anthropologists to provide strategic expert witnessing
in defense of the peyote movement.
2. The Origins of the Peyote Controversy
Peyote (Lophophora williamsii) is a small and spineless cactus with psychoactive properties, which
grows in a limited area situated at the junction of southern Texas and northern Mexico. It is light
green and segmented, approximately one to two inches across, and grows singly or in clusters close
to the ground from a long taproot. The plant is harvested by cutting off the exposed tops of the
plant, leaving the root to produce more “buttons”—as the tops are usually called—which are then
traditionally dried before being eaten. Despite its bitter taste, which usually causes unpleasant bodily
symptoms—including nausea, dizziness, and vomiting—peyote is reported to produce a warm and
delightful euphoria, relaxation, colorful visual distortions, stimulated imagination, and a sense of
timelessness. The effects, caused primarily by the presence of mescaline—whose structure is partially
homologous to LSD—peaks two to four hours after consumption, and declines over the next 8 h
(Anderson 1996; Rojas-Aréchiga and Flores 2016).
The Aztec origin of the word “peyote” suggests that, for thousands of years before the “discovery”
of America, populations living in the area of peyote growth along the lower Rio Grande and south
into Mexico as far as Querétaro, were familiar with the plant and its psychoactive properties; recent
archeological studies indicate that peyote is likely to have been known and used by native North
Americans since at 5700 years ago (El-Seedi et al. 2005; Terrya et al. 2006). It can thus be assumed
that the peyote cactus has been used for millennia as an entheogen1 by American indigenous peoples
and cherished for its curative properties, where it has been employed to treat such varied ailments
as toothache, labor and breast pain, fever, skin diseases, rheumatism, diabetes, colds, and blindness
(Schultes 1938). Although peyote has for a time been depicted by medical research as a dangerous drug
in an effort to diabolize its use and justify prohibitionist efforts, it is nowadays generally recognized
that the cactus is neither habit-forming nor harmful when used in the controlled ambience of a peyote
ceremony (Halpern et al. 2005).
Although the use of peyote had been historically limited to indigenous peoples located in the
territory of Mexico, prompting attempts by the Inquisition in New Spain to prohibit its use (Section 2.1),
1 The neologism “entheogen” (“generating the divine within”) refers to any psychoactive substance when used for its
religious or spiritual effects, whether or not in a formal religious or traditional structure. This neologism, coined in the
late 1970s by a group of ethnobotanists and religious scholars, including Richard Evans Schultes and Robert Gordon
Wasson (Godlaski 2011), is often chosen to contrast with recreational use of the same substances. Entheogens have been
used in a ritualized context for thousands of years and their religious significance is well established with anthropological
and academic literature. Examples of traditional entheogens include psilocybin mushrooms, ayahuasca, iboga, salvia,
and cannabis (Cavnar and Labate 2016).
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the dynamics of colonial expansion in North America have resulted in the progressive diffusion of
these entheogenic practices outside their traditional territory, all the way from Western Central Mexico
to the Canadian province of Alberta (Section 2.2). This geographical expansion of peyote use, which
led to the structuration of a vast religious movement in the United States, quickly became an object
of interests for late 19th century anthropologists, and most notably for James Mooney, who played a
crucial role as cultural expert in the defense of peyotism during the early 20th century (Section 2.3).
2.1. The Mexican Precedent
The Spanish, through the intermediary of missionary Bernardino de Sahagún, encountered peyote
a couple of decades after their conquest of the Aztecs (León-Portilla 2002; Stewart 1993). To a large
extent, they vigorously opposed the practice; not so much on account of its physiological effects,
but because of its perceived religious significance for populations they were aiming at converting.
Eating the peyote was declared by the padres to be almost as grave a sin as eating human flesh.
The Inquisition in New Spain, established in 1571, consequently issued an edict of faith banning the
use of peyote in June 1620 (Chuchiak 2012).
Following the publication of the edict, prosecution of cases related to the use of peyote ensued for
much of the next two centuries, with a peak of repression from 1620 to 1650. Although the exact number
of prosecutions related to peyote remains debated among scholars (Aguirre Beltrán 1963; Dawson 2016;
Taylor 1996), the full force of the Inquisition’s prohibition was to be felt on non-indigenous populations,
firstly because of the controversial question of the Inquisition’s jurisdiction of over indigenous peoples
(Greenleaf 1965), but also because the risk of “contagion” was considered a more important issue than
the continuation of heretical beliefs among the Natives (Quezada 1991). In any case, New Spain’s
colonial authorities did not succeed in eradicating entheogenic uses of peyote. After Spain lost control
to Mexico in 1821, numerous evidence indeed indicate that peyote use was continued among tribes
who lived in remote areas and where able to maintain their identities and traditions—most notably the
Huichol, the Cora, and the Tarahumara, who continue until today to conduct elaborate pilgraimages to
peyote fields (Lumholtz 1902; Benciolini and del Ángel 2016).
2.2. The Diffusion of Peyotism2 in the United States
Although the use of peyote had been for a long time limited to populations located in the territory
of what is now northern Mexico, the dynamics of colonial expansion in North America prompted the
diffusion of these entheogenic practices outside of its traditional territory—to such extent that it would
eventually become the first pan-tribal religion in the United States. Paradoxically, the federal policy of
removing Native American tribes from their ancestral lands to newly created reservations in the 19th
century played a critical role in the introduction of peyote in the country (Jahoda 1995). The situation
of closeness induced by the massive relocation of these tribes, together with a shared condition of
cultural disintegration, logically prompted exchanges among them, including the use of peyote in or
near the newly established “Indian Territory”—which comprised present-day Oklahoma and parts
of Arkansas.
The scale of the diffusion of peyote among fundamentally diverse Native American groups
can therefore not be understood outside of this historical context. As the U.S. government was
trying hard to suppress “backward cultures” through aggressive assimilationist policies—among
which the Indian Religious Crimes Code, promulgated in 1883 (Irwin 1997)—new religious and
spiritual movements emerged among native populations in order to find answers to this critical
crisis of identity: these include the Ghost Dance movement and peyotism. Authors (Petrullo 1934;
2 “Peyotism” generally refers to the entheogenic use of peyote as practiced by Native Americans; by extension, “peyotists”
refers to the practitioners of the faith. The term was framed by Vincenzo Petrullo in his 1934 doctoral dissertation
(Petrullo 1934).
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La Barre 1938; Schultes 1938; Stewart 1993) have put forward other concurring factors in the further
diffusion of peyote use: one of them is the role of the Carlisle Indian School, founded in Pennsylvania
in 1879, and which remained the flagship Indian boarding school in the U.S. until 1918 (Adams 1997).
Considering that over 10,000 Native American children from 140 tribes attended the school—many of
whom became influential in tribal affairs when returning to the reservation—it is reasonable to assume
that it helped the propagation of peyote use throughout the U.S. territory.
2.3. James Mooney (1861–1921) and the Early Ethnography of Peyotism
From the 1880s onward, with the availability of peyote, the development of railroads and the
stability of life on the newly established reservations (Morgan and Stewart 1984), peyotism started to
spread steadily beyond Oklahoma, thanks notably to the work of avowed missionaries such as that of
Comanche Chief Quanah Parker (c. 1845–1911), who played a crucial role in the early structuration of
the cult (Hagan 1993). The first description of a peyote ceremony was carried out by James Mooney in
1891, a few years after he was hired as an ethnologist by the Bureau of American Ethnology of the
Smithsonian Institute (Colby 1978; Moses 2002). In 1890 and 1891, he traveled to Oklahoma in order to
study the emerging Ghost Dance movement. He soon discovered that another religious movement
was taking place in Indian Territory: the peyote religion—or, as he initially called it, the “mescal cult.”
Mooney managed to participate in several all-night peyote rituals; his notes and photographs are the
first detailed description of the peyote ceremony in the United States. He wrote a number of relateed
articles over the next decade, describing in detail the ritual and theology of the emerging religious
movement (e.g., Mooney 1891, 1892, 1896).
The more Mooney studied the rite that had over time become a religion, the more he came to
believe that the opposition to peyote by missionaries, Indian Service agents, and eventually reformers
among Native Americans themselves was misdirected zeal. For the rest of his life, Mooney was much
involved in studying the spiritual and medicinal rational behind the peyote cult. Convinced that
peyotism was uniquely able to provide a source of unity and cultural integrity to the multitude of
Native American tribes uprooted from their traditional territories and thrown together on reservations,
he came to play a precursing and instrumental role as cultural expert in the legal defense of the
entheogenic practice.
3. The Role of Anthropologists in the Legislative Battle Against Prohibition (1915–1937)
Peyotism thus gained progressive importance among Native American tribes throughout the end
of the 19th and the early 20th century. However, in a context where psychoactive substances were
becoming the targets of an emerging prohibitionist movement (Musto 1999), it was not long before
missionaries and Indian Service agents became aware of the use of peyote, and tried by different legal
means to stamp it out. Although Native Americans were for a time able to defeat repressive attempts
on their own (Section 3.1), they soon realized that they would need the help of benevolent allies in
order to prevent their opponents from passing prohibition statutes. Led by James Mooney, a first
generation of anthropologists brought their help to Peyotists, providing testimonies before legislative
bodies (Section 3.2), and later encouraged the movement’s leaders to consolidate peyote use into an
established religion whose practice would be protected by law (Section 3.3). The different modes of
anthopologists’ intervention during this first period of the controversy indicate that, beyond their role
as cultural experts—which technically imply a neutral position—these scholars also became decisive
advocates of this indigenous movement.
3.1. Early Regulatory Efforts
Closely connected with a passion to assimilate Native Americans, initial attempts to prohibit
the use of peyote at the level of newly established reservations (Section 3.1.1) and Indian Territory
(Section 3.1.2) did little to impede the spread of the movement. Peyote leaders even proved successful
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at defeating the passing of a state law in 1908, and skillfully argued the few cases that their devoted
opponents were able to bring to court during this period (Section 3.1.3).
3.1.1. The Failure of Prohibiting Orders on Reservations
The first published reference to the use of peyote by Native Americans in the U.S. is credited to
J. Lee Hall, agent of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency in the Indian Territory. In his 1886 annual report,
he reported that “the Comanches and a few of the Kiowa secure the tops of a kind of cactus that comes
from Mexico, which they eat, and it produces the same effect as opium. [ . . . ] suggest that the same
should be made contraband” (Stewart 1993). This alert prompted initial regulatory responses by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in the form of local executive orders aiming at prohibiting the practice
at the level of reservations (Jackson and Galli 1977).
The first such order was issued by Special agent E. E. White of the Kiowa-Comanche Agency,
on June 6, 1888. White then transmitted the order to the BIA, advocating for his initiative to be replicated
in reservations where peyote had taken hold. The action was received favorably, and instructions
were given to investigate the issue to all agencies and to prosecute the use, sale, exchange, gift,
or introduction of the “mescal bean” as a misdemeanor under the rules governing the recently created
Courts of Indian Offenses. The strategy however proved rather ineffective, as peyotism continued
to spread in spite of the numerous prohibiting orders (Mooney 1897). White himself, less than two
months after he posted the order, reached an agreement with the skillful Quanah Parker by which he
permitted the Cheyenne “to use their [peyote] one night at each full moon for three or four months
[ . . . ] and that they would not eat any at any other time. They also agreed that when their present
supply of [peyote] gave out, they would quit entirely” (Stewart 1993).
3.1.2. The Inapplicability of the Territorial Law
Acknoweldging the shortcomings of prohibitive orders, the first statute to control the use of peyote
was adopted in the Territory of Oklahoma in 1899. Declaring unlawful to introduce, possess, or sell
any “mescal bean” on the Territory, the statute provided for a minimum punishment of twenty-five
dollars and a prison sentence to a maximum of six months. Yet, reports by agents on reservation
indicate that the law remained poorly enforced, as they were often confused and doubtful about how
to do it (La Barre 1938). When it was finally tested in court in 1907, the statute was eventually astutely
defeated by Peyotists thanks to the semantic confusion it carried.
Following a police raid of a peyote meeting on the information from a white farmer working with
the Cheyenne and Arapaho, three Peyotists were arrested and charged for possession of “mescal beans.”
They were convicted by a probate judge on the basis of the 1899 Territorial law, and consequently
fined twenty-five dollars each, and sentenced to five days in the county jail. On appeal, the District
Court for the Kingfisher County however dismissed the case, holding that the defendants were found
in possession not of mescal beans (Sophora secundiflora), but of peyote (Lophora williamsii); that the
two were not the same thing; and that there was no law prohibiting the possession and use of peyote.
Although seemingly trivial, this semantic confusion rendered the first legislative effort against the use
of peyote in the inoperative3.
3 Another ceremony was raided in April of the same year in Custer County, Oklahoma, resulting on the arrest of nine
Cheyenne and Arapaho Peyotists, and seven Native American “witnesses”. The case was brought to trial at Arapaho in
July, and a similar “semantic” defense was raised. Again, the court dismissed the charges, founding that mescal was not to
be confused with peyote, and that the latter was not covered by the Territorial statute. Stewart reports that this semantic
confusion dated back to the late 19th century, when the use of peyote was first observed by American authorities and
confused with that of mescal (Stewart 1993).
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3.1.3. An Attempt at Passing a State Law
At the turn of 1908, as Oklahoma was preparing to apply for statehood, local Indian Service agents
who had been leading the charge on peyotism wanted to be ready for an anti-peyote state law, with the
objective of setting a precedent to be replicated by other states where the religious movement was
disseminating. As the time for the Constitutional Convention approached, promoters for the law sent
support letters to members of the legislature and some even went to Guthrie to lobby members of
the convention. Yet, Native Americans proved just as proactive in defending their interests. At the
thirty-sixth day of the first Oklahoma legislature, over a hundred prominent representatives of the
Comanche, Kiowa, Cheyenne, Osage, Ponca, Arapaho, Iowa, Sac, and Fox tribes filled the legislative
hall. On four occasions, twice during the constitutional convention and twice at the first Oklahoma
legislature six months later, Indian leaders assertively voiced their concerns about laws that restricted
their rights to practice their medicine and religion (Wiedman 2012). On December 17, 1906, Quanah
Parker was invited to speak before the Oklahoma constitutional convention, where he insisted on the
medicial value of peyote use:
Gentlemen, I am glad to meet you all this morning. My name is Quanah Parker. [ . . . ] I am an
Indian myself; I am half white. My mother was a white woman; I attend to the government
business for a good many years. [ . . . ] My Indians use what they call peotus; some call it
mescal; all my Indian people use that for medicine. That is a good medicine and when my
people are sick they use it. It is no poison and we want to keep that medicine. I use that and
I use the white doctor’s medicine, and my people use it too. I want to keep this medicine.
I said while ago, my ways in time will wear out, and in time this medicine will wear out
too. My people are citizens of the United States, and my people keep the right way; they
go to school and teach school; I wish you delegates will look after my people—look after
my Indians. (Oklahoma, Constitutional Convention 1907)
A month after his address, Parker returned from Guthrie with the assurance from President
Murray and other delegates to the Constitutional Convention that no provision of the Oklahoma
constitution will prevent the sale and eating of mescal beans (Wiedman 2012). The state law was thus
eventually defeated, thanks to the ingenious adaptation of Native American leaders to the “white man’s
ways.” However, prohibitionists did not disarm, and as efforts to ban peyote were gaining intensity
with arrests, confiscation of property and verbal abuses on nearly every reservation (Dawson 2018),
the need for new allies became urgent: hence emerged the first generation of anthropologists who,
at various degrees, devoted themselves to the legal defense of peyotism.
3.2. The Increasing Involvement of Anthropologists in the Legislative Arena
By the end of the 1910s, peyotism had taken roots in at least eleven states beyond Oklahoma
(La Barre 1938). This situation comforted opponents to peyote in the idea that comprehensive and
concerted action was needed: they thus started to campaign actively for the adoption of a Federal law.
Eleven bills were introduced in Congress between 1916 and 1937. All failed, however, thanks to the
vigilance of Peyotists and the contribution of supportive anthropologists, who appeared several times
before legislative bodies in order to testify as to the cultural significance of the practice for Native
Americans. This was notably the case in 1915 before the Board of Indian Commissioners (Section 3.2.1)
and during the pivotal 1918 House hearings (Section 3.2.2), providing early examples of the use of
anthropological knowledge in Native American rights claims in the United States—three decades after
the pioneer Choctaw Nation v. United States case (Gormley 1955). The same year, the intensification
of prohibitionists’ efforts led anthropologist James Mooney to encourage the movement’s leaders
to strategically incorporate into an establish church—a decision that would prove decisive in the
evolution of the controversy.
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3.2.1. Getting Prepared for the Federal Battle
In 1912, while the BIA sent out to all reservations Circular 598, which asked for information
regarding diffusion of the practice, past court cases, and the “moral, mental, and physical effects”
produced by the use of peyote, the Board of Indian Commissioners joined the lobbying efforts towards
prohibition (Department of the Interior 1912). In February 1915, the Board called a session on the issue
of peyote during its annual meeting, inviting interesting parties to testify as to the nature (and dangers)
of the peyote cult. Alongside tribal leaders Otto Wells (Comanche), Arthur Bonnicastle (Osage) and
tribal attorney Thomas L. Sloan (Osage), three anthropologists, members of the Bureau of American
Ethnology, testified before the Board in defense of peyotism: James Mooney, Francis La Flesche4,
and Truman Michelson5. As opponents to peyote failed to attend the Board’s hearing, the chairman
of the meeting, Oklahoma Representative Charles D. Carter, was forced to admit that: “practically
everything that had been said there by [anthropologists and Native Americans]—who were fine
physical and mental specimens, to all appearances—[ . . . ] had been in favor of this religion and in
favor of the plant itself, as the Indians use it”. The board, however, issued a formal vote by which they
opposed to the use of peyote in any of its forms, and in favor of legislation which will prevent Native
Americans from obtaining it (U.S. Congress, House, and Committee on Indian Affairs 1918).
After a first attempt at amending the Indian Prohibition Law of 1897 by adding a mention
to peyote was made in 1913—and eventually rejected by the Senate—similar propositions were
made for three consecutive years; but never again did they pass neither the House nor the Senate
(Maroukis 2012). Anti-Peyotists finally succeeded in introducing bills explicitly prohibiting the
importation, transportation and sale of peyote before the U.S. Congress in 1916. The first bill
(S. 3526) was however quickly defeated in Senate thanks to the commitment of Senator Robert L.
Owen of Oklahoma, who responded to pressure from his Native American constituency. The next
year, opposition to the Gandy Bill (H.R. 10669) was carried in person to Washington by a delegation of
Native American Peyotists, who obtained a hearing on April 1916. Thanks to these concerted lobbying
efforts, and because of the lack of scientific evidence backing anti-Peyotist arguments, the bill again
failed to pass the House (Stewart 1993).
3.2.2. The Hayden Bill and the 1918 Congressional Hearings
Acknowledging the repeated shortcomings of the previous attempts, BIA requested in April 1917
Representative Carl Hayden of Arizona to introduce a new bill (H.R. 2614). This peyote prohibition bill,
proposing punishments that would include a maximum of one year in jail and a $500 fine, constituted a
pivotal moment in the peyote controversy, as both sides threw all their forces into the legislative battle.
Extensive hearings were convened before a subcommittee of the House; taking place over six days and
gathering no less than twenty-six testimonies, this moment thus provided one of the most dramatic
examples of clashing political interests over the expression of Native American culture during the first
part of the 20th century (U.S. Congress, House, and Committee on Indian Affairs 1918).
Missionaries and reformers led the opposition to peyote, substantiating the argumentation of
the BIA—and trying to compensate for the rather inconclusive scientific evidence presented at the
hearings. All of them denounced the dreadful and deleterious effects of peyote, and urged for its
absolute prohibition, hoping that their call would resonate in Washington, where just months earlier
the Senate had passed the Eighteenth Amendment. Zitkála-Šá, a member of the Yankton Dakota
Sioux Tribe educated at Carlisle also known as Gertrude Bonnin and a fierce opponent to Peyotism
4 La Flesche (1857–1932) was born on the Omaha reservation in Nebraska, and became the first professional Native American
anthropologist. He joined the Bureau of American Ethnology in 1910, and remained until his death. He investigated the
practice of peyote use among the Ponca and the Osage, although he did not published significant work about peyotism
(Mark 1982).
5 Michelson (1879–1938) a distinguished linguist, was not as experienced as Mooney and La Flesche in relation with peyote,
but had the occasion to observe ceremonies among the Northern Arapaho in Wyoming (Boas 1938).
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(Lewandowski 2016), gave a perfect summary of the prohibitionists’ rationales, reciting the evils
of peyote:
Believing that peyote is the comforter sent by God, they reject the teachings of the Church.
Believing that peyote reveals the secret thoughts of man and gives super human knowledge
of the contents of books, they deprecate the necessity of schools. Believing peyote a cure-all
for every human ailment, they ignore the advice and aid of physicians. Attending the weekly
peyote meetings, they waste time, strength, and money, consequently neglecting their homes
and farms. (U.S. Congress, House, and Committee on Indian Affairs 1918 [emphasis added])
In defense of their entheogenic practice, ten Native American representatives provided statements
at the hearings, trying to convince the subcommittee of the innocuousness and the religious sincerity
of their use of peyote. Beside them, the three anthropologists who already testified at the 1915
session—as well as the already prominent ethnobotanist William Safford—provided a rich expertise
in support of the movement. Leading the way, James Mooney intervened at length during the
hearings. He gave a detailed history of Peyotism and the reason for its rapid and steady spread beyond
traditional tribal barriers, and provided a handful of arguments to counteract prohibitionists’ alarming
statements—pointing notably at the poor quality of the available scientific data on peyote and on
its effects. Michelson’s and La Flesche’s testimonies were relatively less substantive, as they had
considerably less experience and knowledge about Peyotism. However, based on their observations
among the Arapaho for the former, and the Ponca and Osage for the latter, they affirmed that they
were thoroughly convinced by the religious sincerity of those who participated in the cult, and insisted
on the grave consequences that its suppression would induce. This mode of legislative intervention
was evidently crucial, allowing cultural experts to document and demonstrate the cultural depth of
Peyotists’ entheogenic practice before federal lawmakers.
Mooney however received a particularly hostile reception. His lengthy defense of the medicinal
and religious significance of peyote was repeatedly met with hostility—if not disdain—by members
of the subcommittee. General Richard H. Pratt went even further, challenging the impartiality of
the anthropologists’ statements: accusing them of encouraging Native Americans to maintain “old,
unhealthy, and uncivilized customs” so they could continue writing exotic books, and thus exploit
Native Americans while doing nothing to help them become civilized; the former head of the Carlisle
Indian School directly questioned Mooney’s probity and made several insinuations about the role of
anthropologists in the spread of Peyotism:
My experience is that the Bureau of Ethnology has never been helpful to the Indians in any
respect [ . . . ] the ethnologists always lead the Indian’s mind back into the past. [ . . . ] You
ethnologists egg on, frequent, illustrate, and exaggerate at the public expense, and so give
the Indian race and their civilization a black eye in the public esteem. It was well established
at the time of the ghost-dance craze among the Indians that white men were its promoters if
not its originators. That this peyote craze is under the same impulse is evident from what
appears in this evidence. (U.S. Congress, House, and Committee on Indian Affairs 1918)
Beyond the caricature nature of General Pratt’s attacks, the general dismissal of Mooney’s
argumentation at the hearings heuristically underlines the problematic duality of the anthropologists’
position in this legal controversy, navigating between a supposedly impartial position as cultural experts,
and an arguably biased engagement as advocates for Peyotists’ religious rights. It should be further
noted that Pratt’s assertions resonate to a certain extent with the critics against anthropology’s tendency
for paternalist primitivism that emerged from within the discipline since the 1960s (e.g., Foster 1969;
Lewis 1973; Memmi and Greenfield 1967).
Mooney endeavored to respond to these accusations. He claimed—in a no less simplistic
manner—“Now, in regard to an ethnologist never having helped the Indians. As a matter of fact,
anybody who knows anything about ethnologists knows that is not true. The Indians look up on
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ethnologists as their best friends.” In any case, Pratt’s rhetorical strategy undoubtedly suggests that
anti-Peyotists had come to acknowledge the crucial role of anthropologists’ testimony for the legal
defense of the entheogenic practice they were trying to stamp out. In its report in favor of prohibition
submitted after the 1918 hearings, the House subcommittee hence made a particularly interesting claim
on this matter, implicitly supporting Pratt’s attacks on Mooney as untrustworthy and self-interested:
The proof is clear that the physicians, the chemists, the missionaries, and many of those who
are endeavoring to uplift the Indian, are convinced of the harmful effects of peyote and desire
to see its use discontinued. [ . . . ] The writer of this report heard many Indians testify on
behalf of the drug, and gave due weight to their testimony, but certainly they are to some
extent interested, while the bulk of those advocating the passage of the bill are disinterested.
(U.S. Congress, House, and Committee on Indian Affairs 1918 [emphasis added])
This was however not enough to secure the adoption of prohibitory legislation. The bill passed
the House on October 3, 1919, but was rejected in the Senate, thanks again to the efforts of Oklahoma
Senator Robert L. Owen (Owen claimed Cherokee ancestry and had been a teacher and Indian Agent
among the Cherokee earlier in his career); arguing that the ban represented a violation of Native
American First Amendment rights and managed to quash the bill (Belcher 1953); thus ending the most
serious attempt to pass a federal law: explicitly prohibiting the use of peyote.
3.3. The Creation of the Native American Church
The legislative battle of 1918 constituted a particularly tough fight, and Peyotists realized that
they won a close victory. Aware that the battle was not over, James Mooney and several of the
movement’s leaders understood that in order to prevail again, they would have to find a way to
consolidate the legality of peyote use. Hence emerged the idea to make Peyotism conform to other
religious institutions, and to equate the ceremonial use of peyote to the sacramental use of wine by
Catholics and Jews—which had just received constitutional protection in the context of the prohibition
(Newsom 2005). But to be recognized as a religious organization, Peyotists needed more than their
personal belief: they needed a name, a set of rules, officers, and stated responsibilities. They needed to
be “incorporated.” With several state bans already in place (see infra Section 4.1.1) and a national ban
narrowly avoided, the leading Oklahoma Peyotists therefore gathered in the end of the summer of
1918 in El Reno to draw up a charter and establish a peyote church.
3.3.1. A Preventive Legal Strategy
Assembling the representatives of most Native American tribes in Oklahoma, for whom the 1918
hearings had become a springboard to action, the group did not equivocate about the use of the word
peyote, realizing that this was the issue and that it had to be openly acknowledged. The Article 2 of the
Native American Church (NAC) Certificate of Incorporation, signed on October 10, 1918, thus read,
The purpose for which this corporation is formed is to foster and promote the religious belief
of the several tribes of Indians in the state of Oklahoma, in the Christian religion with the
practice of the Peyote Sacrament as commonly understood and used among the adherents of
this religion. (Stewart 1993 [emphasis added])
The decision to incorporate a peyote church, whose name emphasized both the Christian and
indigenous roots of the church, as well as its pan-tribal nature, would soon prove instrumental in
preventing a total federal ban on peyote. Not only did it place Peyotists within the established legal
architecture, thereby allowing them a floor from which to debate, but it also gave them strength
in numbers6.
6 The NAC nowadays claims close to 300,000 members and hundreds of local chapters, with members belonging to more than
seventy Native American tribes. The church has retained a complex and loosely organized structure, divided between four
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The incorporation of the church was vigorously and consistently denounced by opponents to
peyote as an opportunistic strategy (e.g. Bureau of Indian Affairs 1922). Yet, the sincerity of the religious
dimension of the ceremony for Native American users of peyote was never seriously challenged in
court or before legislative and administrative authorities. This strategy of preventive legal action
therefore constitutes a remarkable case of cultural adaptation of Native Americans to the “colonizers’
mentality”: it demonstrates a profound understanding of the role of legal institutions in the U.S. and
of how Native Americans could adapt to the political system that was being imposed upon them in
order to effectively safeguard their ritual practice against relentless opponents. Only a few decades
after the end of the Indian Wars, this episode indicates that the “civilization of the Indian” had yielded
unforeseen results.
3.3.2. The Role of Anthropologists in the Creation of the NAC
The implication of James Mooney in the incorporation of the NAC certainly constitutes a unique
example of anthropologists’ involvement in indigenous rights controversies, particularly with respect
to the modality of its intervention as cultural expert (Holden 2019b). In this instance, Mooney’s role
has indeed not consisted in delivering expert testimonies for the use of courts or legislative bodies, i.e.,
in translating in legally legible terms an exotic culture in the context of legal proceedings, but rather
in assisting an indigenous community in its strategic adaptation to, and recapture of the cultural
patterns of the majority group. Although we lack precise information, several sources suggest that
Mooney, alongside tribal lawyers, played an instrumental role in the Peyotists’ decision of establishing
the NAC, recognizing that making explicit the sacramental nature of the peyote ceremony in the
articles of incorporation would help consolidate the religious character of the movement, and thereby
significantly complicate the legal crusade of anti-Peyotists.
According to Maroukis (2012) and Moses (1978), Mooney returned to Oklahoma after the
congressional hearings in early July 1918, fearing that the Hayden bill would eventually be adopted.
He visited many of his Native American friends and informers, attended peyote services, and several
elements suggest that he played a crucial role in the foundational meeting of El Reno. According
the testimony of Kiowa-Apache Jim Whitewolf, Mooney was present at the meeting, and even
recommended the name “Native American Church,” despite the overwhelming presence of Oklahoma
Peyotists. Slotkin similarly reported in its 1955 work on the sociology of the peyote movement that
there was “reason to believe that it was on Mooney’s initiative that the Native American Church was
incorporated in Oklahoma” (Slotkin 1955).
The implication of Mooney in the institutional consolidation of Native American Peyotism
constitutes a remarkable illustration of anthropologists’ dilemma when, called upon to provide neutral
and independent expertise for legal purposes, they sometimes find themselves invested in parallel
advocacy practices in support of minority rights that tend to question their impartiality—or even their
academic credibility. This debate over cultural experts’ neutrality, which later unfold primarily in
relation to anthropologists’ expert witnessing per se (Rosen 1977; Lewis 1988; Mertz 1994), has proved
a complex question in consideration of anthropologists’ frequent engagement towards the protection
of subaltern and vulnerable groups, raising ethical and deontological issues beyond legal and political
considerations. In the case of Mooney, whether or not he actually participated in the drafting of the
NAC articles of incorporation, it remains that members of the Indian Service administration were
convinced that he had counseled and supported the officers of the newly created church.
main branches—none of which having any direct theological or legal control over the others—: the NAC of Oklahoma,
the NAC of North America, the Azee Bee Nahagha of Diné Nation, and the NAC of South Dakota (Smith and Snake 1996;
Maroukis 2012).
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3.3.3. The Subsequent Retaliation against James Mooney
This suspicion had direct and dire consequences on the career of Mooney. His return to Oklahoma
in July 1918, only a few months after the heated hearings before the House subcommittee, further
aggravated the exasperation concerning its implication in defense of Peyotism. Informed of the
situation by Agency officials and missionaries, Indian Commissioner Cato Sells requested the director
of the Smithsonian Institution to take immediate action. He explained to Secretary Walcott: “I regard
the situation [ . . . ] as a serious interference with our efforts to control and eventually entirely eliminate
the use of peyote by Indians and feel that you will appreciate the advisability of the immediate recall
of Mr. Mooney” (Moses 1978). The Bureau of American Ethnology endeavored to resist governmental
pressure, putting forward Mooney’s reputation—notably in relation to his foundational work on the
Ghost Dance movement (Mooney 2012). Yet, he was eventually recalled and never again allowed to
return to Oklahoma to continue his study. By 1921, Mooney was severely ill, and his salary at the
Bureau of American Ethnology slashed for “nonproduction.” In a letter he wrote to a colleague in
Oklahoma just before he left the service that September, Mooney lamented that the government was
looking for opportunities to “impede and suppress” his peyote investigations “altogether, to leave the
way clear for hostile legislation” (Dawson 2018). James Mooney died a few weeks later of a heart attack.
This episode of institutional retaliation demonstrates the distress of prohibitionists, and dramatically
speaks for the crucial role that James Mooney played throughout this period. At the end of the 1910s,
Native American Peyotists, with the help of supportive anthropologists who both testified before
legislative bodies and put their knowledge of the American legal system at the service of the movement,
had won two crucial battles with the very weapons of their opponents.
4. The Role of Anthropologists in the Legal Defense of Peyotism before Courts (1956–1980)
The failure of the Hayden bill and the opportunistic incorporation of the Native American Church
that followed led advocates of a federal prohibition to a deadlock. Anti-Peyotists continued to introduce
new bills almost every year from 1919 to 1926—without success. They thus shifted their efforts to
state legislatures, where they were able to secure the adoption of anti-peyote laws in two-dozen states
(Section 4.1). Peyotists were consequently forced to adapt their legal strategy, and started to embrace
a test case approach after the Second World War in order to challenge the constitutionality of these
new laws before courts. They were helped in this by a new generation of anthropologists who further
developed the academic understanding of the peyote movement beyond Mooney’s pioneer research
and adopted a new mode of legal intervention: expert witnessing (Section 4.2).
However, this reconfiguration of the controversy, and the substance and modality of anthropologists’
involvement, allowed for an essentialist narrative of Peyotism to progressively consolidate.
This evolution—conforming the entheogenic practice to a broadly conceived version of indigeneity
and long-standing orientalist views of the “mystical Indian”—played a critical role in the protection
of the use of peyote by Native Americans. The psychoactive cactus became an Indian thing, beyond
the comprehension of the white man, something that could form the basis of a religion exclusive to
indigenous peoples. This strategic essentialization of Peyotism, despite its ethnographic simplification,
ultimately provided the basis for subsequent claims of legal exemptions, at a moment where the U.S.
were preparing to embark on an all-encompassing policy of drug prohibition.
4.1. The Reconfiguration of the Peyote Controversy
4.1.1. The Multiplication of Anti-peyote State Laws; and Their Relative Efficiency
The national campaign against peyote, which proved eventually ineffective at the federal level,
met with more success in state legislatures where Oklahoma Peyotists had limited—if any—lobbying
capacity. A year before the 1918 hearings, prohibitionists were thus able to pass anti-peyote statutes in
three states: Utah, Colorado, and Nevada. Many more were to follow.
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In Utah, the legislative effort was driven by Gertrude Bonnin; already a veteran fighter against
Peyotism, she was then living on the Ute reservation, where peyote had been introduced a few years
earlier, and had already been adopted by nearly half of the reservation. Alarmed by the situation,
she reached to the state Governor, calling for his help. She substantiated her request with the testimony
of the reservation’s physician, Dr. Henry Lloyd, who denounced the fatal consequences of peyote
use and called its religious dimension “a travesty.” His testimony perfectly exemplifies the rationale
behind its profession’s radical opposition to peyote, viewed as a dangerous concurrent to the White
man’s medicine (Welsh 1918). The first state law prohibiting the possession and use of peyote was thus
prepared, and eventually adopted in February 19177. Kansas became the fourth state to outlaw peyote
in 1919, followed in 1923 by Arizona, Montana, and North and South Dakota. Iowa, New Mexico
and Wyoming, and Idaho passed similar laws (in 1925, 1929, and 1933, respectively). Hence, at the
notable exception of Oklahoma—where the cult emerged—and Texas—where peyote grew and was
collected and shipped across the national territory—almost every Western States concerned with the
use of peyote at that time had adopted prohibitive regulations by the early 1930s.
State laws however proved largely futile in impeding the spread of Peyotism. This was largely
the consequence of the limited jurisdiction of state courts: as long as Native Americans practiced
peyote on their reservations, and in the absence of federal or tribal law prohibiting it, they were free
to do so. States could therefore only interfere with the interstate trade of peyote, although this was
largely circumvented by Peyotists directly traveling to Oklahoma and Texas in order to bring back
peyote themselves, and by the concrete difficulty of such a control (Stewart 1993). Furthermore, local
Indian Service agencies and the BIA in general were significantly more concerned and invested in
the rampant alcohol traffic and its devastating effects on Native American populations (Martin 2003;
Antell and Holmes 2001).
4.1.2. Following the Trail of James Mooney
Meanwhile, a new generation of anthropologists born in the early 20th century progressively
emerged to continue and broaden the seminal work of James Mooney—and, to a lesser extent, of Alfred
Kroeber8. All of them carried out their fieldwork among different Native American tribes in the 1930s
and early 1940s, and although most were interrupted by the Second World War, they all published
influential works on Peyotism, providing a rich source of documentation and argumentation that
allowed for the legal defense of the practice before courts (Section 4.2).
Among them was Weston La Barre (1911–1996). Born in Uniontown (PA), he studied at Princeton
and Yale, and later taught at Rutgers, Wisconsin, and Duke Universities. “The Peyote Cult”, La
Barre’s doctoral dissertation presented at Yale University in 1937, was the result of two summers of
fieldwork he conducted in 1935 and 1936 among the Kiowa. The manuscript, based on a plethoric
bibliography, was published in 1938, and immediately became the reference source on the peyote
movement—notably as James Mooney was not able to carry such work (Moses 2002). Alongside La
Barre was ethnobotanist Richard Evans Schultes (1915–2001), who accompanied him in his second
fieldtrip while he was working on his undergraduate senior thesis in biology. Schultes later published
“The Appeal of Peyote”, a provocative article in which he claimed that the diffusion of peyote should
7 Gertrude Bonnin also participated in the legislative effort in Colorado and Nevada, where anti-peyote statutes were enacted
simultaneously in February 1917. In the case of Nevada, it is interesting to note that the prohibition was adopted a by the
mid-1930s was organized on fourteen reservations and had well over ten-thousand members, decades before peyotism
actually started to spread in the state (Stewart 1993).
8 Alfred L. Kroeber (1876–1960), a figure of American cultural anthropology, received his Ph.D. under the supervision of
Franz Boas at Columbia University in 1901 (the first doctorate in anthropology awarded by the University). He then became
the first professor appointed to the Department of Anthropology at Berkeley University. He observed and wrote about the
use of peyote in the context of his doctoral research among the Arapaho (Kroeber 1902).
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be understood in relation to the medicinal value that Native Americans attribute to it, rather than to its
spiritual significance (Schultes 1938)9.
The first monograph on Peyotism was however published in 1934 by Vincenzo Petrullo (1906–1991):
titled “The Diabolic Root: A Study of Peyotism, the New Religion Among the Delawares”, it was
result of the Ph.D. in Anthropology he obtained at the University of Pennsylvania the same year
(Petrullo 1934). The contribution of James Slotkin, although published later, also deserves to be evoked
here. Receiving his Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Chicago in 1940, Slotkin (1913–1958)
published in 1952 the results of his research on Menominee Peyotism with ethnomusicologist David P.
McAllester (Slotkin and McAllester 1952). He also produced groundbreaking research on the historical
origins of the movement (Slotkin 1951, 1955). Finally, he published the reference work on the early
history of the Native American Church (Slotkin 1956). In 1954, he was nominated on the board of
trustees of the NAC, and brought his help in furthering the organization of the Church; he notably
introduced printed membership cards and certificates of group affiliation for members in order to
strengthen legal protection. Working closely with NAC President Dale, Slotkin also offered to publish
a quarterly newsletter for the NAC and to distribute and analyze a questionnaire to document the
location and number of NAC members (Stewart 1993).
Last but not least was Omer C. Stewart (1908–1991). Trained in anthropology at the University of
Utah and the University of California at Berkeley, where he carried out his fieldwork on southwestern
tribes’ Peyotism and received a doctorate in 1939, Stewart published close to thirty articles and
monographs on the topic (e.g., Stewart 1941, 1944, 1948; Aberle and Stewart 1957), together with a
crucial book on the origin and spread of the peyote movement (Stewart 1993). In this connection,
he was appointed as expert witness in eight court cases from 1960 to 1982, where he vehemently
defended the right of Native Americans to use peyote as a sacrament. Just as James Mooney proved
instrumental in the legal incorporation of the NAC and the correlated efforts to block the passing of
federal laws against peyote during the early 20th century, Stewart was undoubtedly a fundamental
asset in the legal strategy elaborated by the NAC to fight state prohibition laws.
4.1.3. The Evolution of the Federal Attitude Towards Peyote
However, before exploring this “second period” of anthropologists’ involvement with the legal
defense of Peyotism, a few words should be said about the establishment of a tolerant federal attitude
towards the movement. Indeed, in the midst of the Great Depression, the election of Franklin D.
Roosevelt in 1932 not only brought a “New Deal” to the American people generally, but also prompted
what was later framed as the “Indian New Deal,” which (notably with the Indian Reorganization Act
of 1934) aimed at reversing the long-standing policy of cultural assimilation of Native Americans.
John Collier, a noted Native American rights advocate and former executive secretary of the
American Indian Defense Association who in the early 1920s had the opportunity to witness in person
the spread of the peyote religion among the Navajo, was sworn in as Indian Commissioner on April
1933. Together with Secretary of Interior Harold L. Ickes, he brought a new philosophy to the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, with a radical departure from the idea that the purpose of the Bureau was to encourage
Native Americans to forego everything Indian as soon as possible and strive to assimilate. Feeling
that the very presence of Indian culture was a great asset to American society, he considered that “the
government should reawaken in the soul of the Indian not only pride in being an Indian, but hope
for the future as an Indian. It had the obligation to preserve the Indian’s love and ardor toward the
rich values of Indian life as expressed in their arts, rituals, and cooperative institutions” (Philip 1977).
This new philosophy of Indian affairs led to an evolution of the federal attitude toward the peyote issue,
which was expressed in the Bureau Circular 2970 of 1934. Entitled Indian Religious freedom and Indian
9 Schultes’s argument was challenged by La Barre, who succeeded in imposing his view that the “religious appeal” of peyote
was the crucial element behind peyotism’s rapid and vast expansion (La Barre 1939).
Laws 2019, 8, 12 14 of 22
Culture, it stated that “no interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial expression will hereafter
be tolerated” (Prucha 1990). This profound shift, reflecting Collier’s emphasis on Native American
self-determination, constitutes the first policy statement specifically intended at protecting Native
American religious rights, and allowed putting the entheogenic use of peyote out of prohibitionists’
reach at the federal level for several decades (O’Brien 1995).
Yet, this reorientation of the federal Indian policy also undeniably participated in the
consolidation of an essentialist approach towards Native American cultural and religious expressions
(Rosemblatt 2018)—including de facto peyote use. This evolution, eventually reflected in the practical
and substantive transformation of anthropologists’ involvement in the controversy during this period,
found its first concrete illustration in 1937, after a new anti-peyote bill was introduced by Senator
Dennis Chávez of New Mexico—the first to reach the floor of the Senate since 1919. In reaction, Collier
endeavored to gather a wealth of expert opinion against the bill from several renowned anthropologists
(notably Franz Boas and Alfred L. Kroeber), completed by the testimony of Vincenzo Petrullo, Weston
La Barre, and Richard Schultes, who had just published their seminal works on the issue. All of these
opinions, together with those of other scientists and Native American leaders, were assembled in a
document named “Statement against the Chavez Senate Bill 1349” (Boas et al. 1937), which offered
a powerful and overwhelming rebuttal of prohibitionists’ claims and contributed to the bill quietly
disappearing before being examined by the Senate (Maroukis 2012).
From the late 1910s to the years preceding the Second World War, the peyote controversy was thus
significantly reconfigured. During this period, Peyotism continued to spread across the United States
territory and beyond, well over three hundred miles into Canada (Kahan 2016; Dick and Bradford 2012).
The movement succeeded at the same time in securing the support—or, at least, the toleration—of
federal authorities; support that will prove enduring, even when drug issues became a central political
issue, leading notably to the adoption of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (e.g., Olson 1981).
Meanwhile, the wave of adoption of anti-peyote state laws remained for a time out of the scope of
Peyotists’ advocacy efforts, due to their relative inefficiency. The situation however changed after
the War. Concerned that state prohibition laws may eventually endanger access to peyote, the NAC
endeavored to challenge the constitutionality of these statutes in court and elaborated a new legal
strategy in which the involvement of the “second generation” of peyote anthropologists would
prove instrumental.
4.2. Cultural Expertise and Strategic Litigation
Between 1957 and 1969, inspired by the success of the civil rights movement, the NAC undertook
to challenge anti-peyote legislations in several key states, including New Mexico, Arizona, California,
Colorado, and Texas. The strategy developed by the church (Section 4.2.1), based primarily on test cases
and occasionally supplemented by legislative lobbying, proved efficient in fighting state prohibition
laws (Section 4.2.2). The conflict culminated in the Texas crisis, which threatened to close off access
to peyote (Section 4.2.3). In all of these cases, anthropologists acting as expert witnesses—and most
notably Omer Stewart—played a crucial role in supporting the legal struggle of the NAC (Section 4.2.4).
4.2.1. Elaborating a Test Case Strategy
It is under the presidency of Frank Takes Gun (1956–1969) that the NAC started to embark on an
offensive legal crusade against state anti-peyote laws. Inspired by the success of the National Association
for the Advancement of Colored Peoples (NAACP) and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),
which culminated in the adoption of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, the NAC considered the opportunity
of challenging the constitutionality of these statutes through individual cases, supplementing the
strategy with the involvement of anthropologists acting as expert witnesses, a practice that had started
to developed since the 1950s (Holden 2011, 2019b; Rodriguez 2018). Take Guns therefore established
relationships with the ACLU, and was able to solicit their aid in representing Native American litigants
in subsequent cases (Slotkin 1956).
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The strategy was first tested in Arizona, where a bitter internal conflict was opposing Navajo on
the use of peyote since the early 1940s after the Tribal council had adopted a resolution prohibiting
the possession and use of peyote on the reservation (Aberle 1966); two decades of controversy
ensued, marking a significant backlash to Commissioner Collier’s policy (Dawson 2018; Stewart 1993).
Interestingly, the conflict prompted the intervention of anthropologists through national media: in July
and November 1951, statements favorable to peyote written by Stewart, La Barre, Slotkin, McAllester,
and others, were thus published by Time and Science magazines in reaction to an article particularly
hostile to peyote and based on assertions from Dr. Clarence Salisbury, the medical missionary to the
Navajo and head of the Navajo Presbyterian Mission (Time 1951a, 1951b; La Barre et al. 1951). A few
months after his election, Take Guns consequently took the opportunity of the arrest of Navajo Peyotist
Mike Kiyaani to test the legal validity of the Tribal council resolution. A writ of habeas corpus was
filed, and, at trial on February 1957, anthropologist James Slotkin was appointed as an expert witness
for Kiyaani, supporting the lawyers’ argument that the resolution was violating the Free Exercise
Clause of the 1st Amendment. Although the case was lost, it convinced the NAC that this legal strategy
could prove an efficient weapon against harassment and legal oppression10.
The first success for the NAC test case strategy occurred in 1960, when the church took the
opportunity of the prosecution of Navajo Peyotist Mary Attakai to challenge the constitutionality of the
state law prohibiting peyote in Arizona. At trial, anthropologist Omer Stewart testified at length about
the peyote religion, alongside psychiatrist Bernard Gorton, who had studied the effects of mescaline
at the New York Psychiatric Institute in the early 1950s and maintained that peyote was neither
addictive nor harmful. Judge Yale McFate dismissed the charges against Mary Attakai, ruling that the
Arizona statute was unconstitutional as applied to the acts of the defendant in the conduct and practice
of her religious practice. He notably noted: “The use of peyote is essential to the existence of the
peyote religion. Without it, the practice of the religion would be effectively prevented11.” On 25 April
1961, the Supreme Court of Arizona dismissed the appeal of the decision, marking the first judicial
acknowledgement of the consolidation of peyote ceremonial use into a legitimate religious practice.
4.2.2. The Woody Decision (1964) and Subsequent Successes
The most resounding victory in the NAC test case strategy against state anti-peyote laws occurred
only a few years later in California. In April 1962, three Navajo railroad workers were arrested after a
peyote ceremony was raided in the desert near Needles, California. Jack Woody, Leon B. Anderson,
and Dan Dee Nez were charged with illegal possession of peyote in violation of the California
anti-peyote law, adopted in 1959 (Stewart 1986). As in the Attakai case, the NAC immediately joined
the procedure and arranged for Omer Stewart to provide expert testimony during the trial before
the Superior Court in November 1962—alongside Gordon A. Alles, professor of pharmacology at
UCLA. The three defendants pleaded not guilty, claiming that their possession of peyote was incident
to the observance of their faith and that the state could not constitutionally invoke the statute against
them without abridging their right to the free exercise of their religion. The court nonetheless held
the defendants guilty and imposed suspended sentences for terms of two to ten years in state prison.
Interestingly, Judge Carl B. Hillard expressed reservations with the NAC litigation strategy, noting,
“Any plea that might be advanced in behalf of less restrictive treatment of peyote should be addressed
to a legislative rather than a judicial remedy.” In response to the decision, a bill to accommodate
the religious use of peyote was introduced in January 1963 by Nicholas C. Petris, a member of the
California State Assembly. Although the bill was defeated in the Senate’s Committee on Public Health
10 The peyote prohibition on the Navajo reservation was eventually lifted a decade later. It is now estimated that over half
the Tribe’s members have adopted peyotism, meaning that about one-fourth of the membership in the NAC is Navajo
(Stewart 1993).
11 Through the intermediary of Omer Stewart, the opinion was published in the American Anthropologist (American
Anthropologist 1961).
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and Safety, it contributed to the considerable media attention already received by the case at that stage
(New York Times 1962; Weeks 1962).
The Superior Court’s decision was consequently appealed to the California Second District Court
of Appeal in Los Angeles, which upheld the conviction. The case was further appealed to the Supreme
Court of California in 1964, which, in an eloquent decision, eventually reversed the judgment against
the three Navajo Peyotists. Relying on the Sherbert doctrine recently established by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the court asserted that the state failed at demonstrating a compelling interest in the complete
prohibition of peyote, founding that the sacramental use of the plant presented only slight danger
to the state and to the enforcement of its law, while it constitutes “the sine qua non of defendant’s
faith” and “incorporates the essence of [their] religious expression.” The 21-page decision, delivered
on 24 August 1964, and making extensive use of the cultural evidence presented before the Superior
Court by Omer Stewart, was written by Justice Matthew Tobriner and concurred in by five of the six
other justices. It notably reads,
[The] right to free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our history. In a mass
society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of a self-expression,
however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying
currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give depth and
beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of
the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using peyote one night at a meeting in
a desert hogan near Needles, California.
Following this resounding legal victory in California, the NAC endeavored to challenge the 1917
anti-peyote law in Colorado, taking the opportunity of the arrest in 1966 of a NAC roadman, Immanuel
Trujillo for possession of peyote. Again, Omer Stewart testified at trial, citing the ruling in Woody,
and convinced the Colorado court to dismiss the charges against Trujillo and to declare the 1917 law
unconstitutional as applied to NAC members.
4.2.3. The Texas Crisis (1967–1969)
The strategy was successfully used one last time, after the state of Texas endeavored to revise its
tolerant policy towards peyote by passing the Texas Dangerous Drug Act of 1967, which made the
possession of peyote illegal in the state, even for Native Americans. The decision, threatening to cut
off the access to peyote, sparked intense and immediate concern throughout the reservations where
Peyotism was flourishing. The NAC decided to react forthwith. A few months after the adoption of
the statute, Frank Takes Gun directed a young Navajo, David S. Clark, to get deliberately arrested in
possession of peyote; the arrest occurred in Laredo in March 1968.
Again, an anthropologist was appointed by the NAC to provide an expert testimony; this time,
it was David Aberle, who had just published a monograph on Navajo peyotism (Aberle 1966). The case
was handled by Judge E. James Kazen, who relied on the California Supreme Court decision in
Woody and found that the Texas indiscriminate prohibition of peyote violated the defendant’s right to
the free exercise of religion; the charges against Clark were consequently dismissed (Schaefer 2015).
The decision was a huge victory for the NAC, but a further effort was needed, as the court’s decision had
force only in his judicial district. A large delegation of NAC officials, with the help of anthropologist J.
Gilbert McAllister from the University of Texas, eventually persuaded in 1969 the Texas legislature to
amend its law by exempting members of the NAC from the prohibition (Stewart 1993).
This series of legal victories however tended to produce a judicial understanding of Peyotism
attuned to the racial sensibilities of American law, consolidating a reductive narrative of peyote use as
exclusively belonging to the indigenous realm (Dawson 2018). Attached to the protection of Native
American rights, anthropologists intervening as expert witnesses in these litigations found themselves
enrolled in this process of essentialization of Peyotism, and therefore departed from Mooney’s wider
opposition to the prohibition of peyote.
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4.2.4. Anthropologists as Strategic Expert Witnesses
In each one of these legal victories against the state prohibition statutes that symbolized the
reconfiguration of the peyote controversy after 1918, anthropologists were directly involved, intervening
as crucial expert witnesses in court—and, even if to a lesser extent, by supporting correlated legislative
lobbying efforts. Although the precise impact of this mediation role on the final ruling is difficult
to assess, the recurrent presence of these scholars undoubtedly constituted a remarkable feature of
the NAC strategy. It also arguably reveals how enduring prejudices against Native American rights’
claims are, as Peyotists seem to have constantly felt the need to have a “legitimate” intermediary—at
least in the eyes of the legal institutions—to give weight to the authenticity of their religious claims
(Spivak 1988).
Omer Stewart has, in this respect, been a central element in the NAC strategic litigation approach.
As said earlier, he appeared in eight court cases related to the Native American religious right to use
peyote in ceremonial settings during that period. He was only replaced at two occasions, when the
expertise of anthropologists James Slotkin and David Aberle was deemed more relevant in consideration
of the litigants’ tribal affiliation and cultural background. To a certain extent, Stewart’s involvement in
the controversy therefore echoes James Mooney’s previous crucial engagement with the legal defense
of Peyotism. The modality and the substance of his contribution are however distinguishable from
Mooney’s in two fundamental ways. Firstly, he substituted the legislative and regulatory mode of
intervention of Mooney by a jurisdictional one: expert witnessing. To a large extent, it can be argued
that this formal evolution of anthropologists’ involvement in the peyote controversy relates both to the
development of anthropological expert witnessing since the 1950s (Holden 2019b; Rodriguez 2018),
and to the concomitant “juridification” (or “right-based” logic) of the life of the law in the United
States (Teubner 1987). Secondly, Stewart—and the “second generation” in general—replaced Mooney’s
indiscriminate contestation of peyote prohibition by a narrower defense of Native American Peyotists’
claim to a limited exemption based on cultural and religious grounds. However, it appears that this
reconfiguration of the substance of anthropologists’ involvement in the conflicts directly results from
a larger movement of essentialization of Peyotism whose rationale has more complex ramifications
(Stewart 1993; Dawson 2018). Finally, it should be added here that, contrary to Mooney, Stewart did
not experience any form of governmental or academic retaliation as a consequence of his dual position
as an expert of Peyotism and an advocate of the movement’s religious freedom12.
Interestingly, Stewart also intervened during this very period in the nascent academic debate over
the involvement of anthropologists as expert witnesses in the U.S. He defended an active participation
of cultural scholars in litigation processes, and directly opposed arguments identifying practical and
ethical issues linked to the specificity of the field. The discussion was initiated by Lawrence Rosen in his
seminal article “The Anthropologist as Expert Witness”, published in 1977 in American Anthropologist
(Rosen 1977), where he notably questioned the adequacy of anthropological knowledge to adversary
legal proceedings and the potential distorting influence of such involvement on anthropologists’
writings—in anticipation of their potential legal significance. Rosen consequently proposed a set of
recommended standards and reforms for anthropological expert witnessing in order to tackle the
ethical and deontological issues he identified. Stewart published his response to Rosen’s article less
than two years after. Against the opinion that anthropologists’ involvement in judicial proceedings
might lead them to change their opinion or adversely influence their writing, he stated emphatically,
“In 25 years as an expert witness I have never experienced any problems of a scholarly or ethical nature”
(Stewart 1979)13.
12 Stewart conserved the chair of the Department of Anthropology at the University of Colorado—which he funded in
1944—until his death in 1991.
13 Unconvinced by Stewart’s arguments, Rosen published his final answer the same year (Rosen 1979). It should be noted here
that this debate unfolded in the context of the Mashpee litigation, whose 41-day trial saw the confrontation of anthropologists’
and historian’s expertise, and was recorded by James Clifford (Clifford 1988).
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Another of Stewart’s implication in legal proceedings relative to Native American rights provides
an interesting supplement to this discussion: Stewart indeed also acted as expert witness for the Indian
Land Claims Commission. In this context, he repeatedly cross swords with anthropologist Julian
H. Steward (his former professor at the University of Utah), who assisted the U.S. government in
a number of cases before the Commission and often denied sufficient social organization to Native
American tribes claiming legitimate occupation of contested territories (Stewart 1979; Pinkoski 2008).
This frontal opposition of expertise provides an illuminating demonstration of how anthropological
knowledge can be employed to advance antagonist political positions in legal proceedings, thereby
reviving the enduring debate over cultural expert witnesses’ neutrality (Lewis 1988; Mertz 1994).
When he was awarded the Society for Applied Anthropology’s Malinowski Award in 1983,
Omer Stewart unequivocally noted in his address: “my most important contribution as an applied
anthropologist has been to help Indians protect themselves from unjust state laws which outlawed
peyote” (Stewart 1983). Native Americans certainly felt the same way; several renowned (and many
anonymous) Peyotists indeed wrote vibrant tributes at Stewart’s death on December 31, 1991
(Deseret News 1992).
5. Conclusions
This series of victories against the precarious legal barriers that anti-Peyotists had strived to
erect against this thriving entheogenic movement did however not put an end to the controversy.
The advent of the psychedelic revolution in the 1960s, together with the correlated intensification of the
war on drugs indeed threatened the legal protection that Peyotists were able to secure after decades of
struggle. Anthropologists continued to intervene in these disputes, although less frequently, as the
conflict progressively settled down14. It should however be reminded here that the complex evolution
of this controversy, which led to the eventual legal protection of Native American Peyotism through a
process of essentialization, also resulted in the disqualification—and correlative prohibition—of other
forms of peyote use, based on a tacit reenactment of racial categories that continues to pervade the
regulation of psychoactive substances (Cavnar and Labate 2016; Dawson 2018).
The two periods considered in this paper constitute remarkable testimonies of the multifaceted
and instrumental role that anthropologists have played in this controversy. Notably, the analysis
demonstrates that the historical evolution of the conflict, which first played out in legislative arena
before migrating to judicial settings, imposed a transformation and a diversification of cultural expertise.
Accordingly, these two periods corresponded to two “generations” of peyote anthropologists, which
each adopted a predominant mode of legal intervention in support of Peyotists’ claims: expert
testimonies before legislative bodies for the first generation and expert witnessing before courts for the
second. Furthermore, this practical transformation of anthropologists’ involvement in the controversy
was accompanied by a reconfiguration of their argumentation: with the consolidation of Peyotism into
an established religion, anthropologists indeed progressively abandoned the general contestation of
the alleged danger of peyote to concentrate their claims on the central and distinctive importance of
peyote use for Native Americans, substantiated by a wealth of ethnographic data accumulated during
the 20th century. Although ultimately reductive and problematic—notably inasmuch as it fails to
integrate the nonrecreational use of peyote by “non-Natives”—it appears that this evolution was made
necessary by the way in which Western legal systems conceive indigeneity, and consequently by the
nature of the judicial interpretation of cultural argumentation.
For all these reasons, the longstanding legal dispute over the entheogenic use of peyote in the
United States holds immense heuristic value for the contemporary reflection on the role and impact of
14 See, for instance, the role of anthropologist Jay C. Fikes in the campaign for the adoption of the 1994 Amendments to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act, which followed the resounding Supreme Court’s decision in Smith and allowed
for the safeguarding of the exemption scheme and a relative stabilization of the controversy (Maroukis 2012).
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cultural expertise in law, and of the various forms that this expertise can take, beyond the conventional
focus on anthropological expert witnessing. In this respect, the contribution of James Mooney proved
particularly instrumental, notably in regard of its implication in the establishment of the Native
American Church, which paved the way for Native American Peyotists’ eventual success in protecting
their use of peyote. Furthermore, the analysis richly exemplifies the enduring and problematic dual
position experienced by anthropologists involved in this type of controversy, navigating between a
supposedly impartial position as experts, and an arguably biased engagement as advocates for Native
American religious rights. This tension, which had dire professional consequences for Mooney, was
arguably even aggravated by the strategic essentialization of Peyotism, leading the “second generation”
to substantiate an essentialist narrative of the entheogenic use of peyote that has until now tended to
simplify the complexity of the practice.
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